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Spinoza, Locke, and the Limits of Dutch Toleration  
 
Geoffrey Gorham 
I.  Introduction 
 
The Netherlands’ reputation as a bastion of religious and political toleration has been 
tested in the last decade by the rise of indigenous anti-immigrant political movements. 
These movements are fueled not only by simple xenophobia and racism, amplified in the 
wake of September 11, but also by the seemingly sincere sentiment that the Netherlands, 
the most densely populated nation in Europe, cannot sustain historical immigration 
levels: “Holland is full.” But another important component of anti-immigrant rhetoric is 
conceptual or ideological rather than practical, and trades on the tolerant self-image of the 
Dutch: toleration does not extend to the intolerant.1 Muslim immigrants are the usual 
target of this argument, who are accused of harboring theocratic, patriarchal, 
homophobic, and anti-Christian or anti-Jewish convictions and designs. Such rhetoric 
raises important and complex questions about how social and political ideals like 
toleration, freedom, and equality—as much as idolatry, infidelity, and heresy—are 
conditioned by the structures of social and economic power in which they historically 
emerge. That is to say, does the ideal of “toleration” in practice merely reinforce the 
boundaries of what is “tolerable” within the dominant culture? 
   I will here be concerned with a somewhat simpler, though related and no less important 
question: how have the most influential supporters of toleration, especially Dutch 
toleration, attempted to identify its limits? More specifically, how have the philosophers 
of toleration approached the issue of tolerating attitudes or behaviors that seem in 
themselves inconsistent with the strictest ideals of toleration? These questions were at 
least as pressing in the Golden Age of the seventeenth century Low Countries, the 
birthplace of the modern philosophy of toleration,2 as they are in contemporary Holland. I 
will emphasize the figures Baruch de Spinoza and John Locke, not only for their 
enormous influence, but also because each had first-hand experience, on the receiving 
end as it were, of Dutch toleration. Spinoza was born into an Amsterdam Jewish 
(Portuguese “Marrano”) community of refugees from the Iberian persecutions and 
expulsions of the sixteenth century. He was eventually alienated from his own 
community and excommunicated from his Temple at the age of 23 for religious heresy.3 
Locke spent a long sojourn in Holland as a political refugee during the restoration of 
monarchical rule in England.4 
 
II.  Locke on Toleration 
 
Locke composed his famous Letter Concerning Toleration in 1685 while living in 
Amsterdam, where he was often in the company of Remonstrant theologians who were 
well-versed in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century Protestant defense of toleration 
originating especially with Arminius and Episcopius. Locke’s letter is actually addressed 
to the Amsterdam theologian Van Limborch, with whom he regularly conversed and 
corresponded.5 Although the Letter is concerned above all with the Christian sectarianism 
of seventeenth-century England and the vexed and heated question of the relationship 
between church and state, it also shows the influence of Dutch cosmopolitanism. The 
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Dutch provinces of the1680s had active Catholic churches and Jewish synagogues, and 
diplomatic ties with Islamic kingdoms.6 Locke himself had Jewish friends in Amsterdam 
and toured heterodox Protestant communities, such as the Labadists in rural Holland. At 
the same time, Protestant Huguenots (such as the influential skeptical philosopher Bayle) 
were flooding into the Low Countries after Louis XIV’s 1685 revocation of the Edict of 
Nantes. Locke declares near the conclusion of his Letter that “neither Pagan, nor 
Mahometan, nor Jew, ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth, 
because of his religion” (Letter 35). But we will see that these civil rights are contingent 
upon the endorsement and profession of principles that are extrinsic to, and potentially in 
tension with, the religions themselves. 
   Locke’s main argument for the toleration of religious heterodoxy is not based on moral 
principles but on rather practical and psychological considerations. Even if we assume, as 
Locke does, that the primary purpose of religion is the “saving of men’s souls” and that 
Christianity is the only reliable means to this end, it does not follow that the state can 
compel its citizens to Christian observance and belief. However well intentioned, such 
coercive religious policies would be futile. The state is powerless to produce religious 
conviction because its power “consists only in outward force; but true and saving religion 
consists in the inward persuasion of the mind” (Letter 6). Fines, imprisonment, and 
torture are hopelessly ineffectual when it comes to faith since “such is the nature of the 
understanding that it cannot be compelled to the belief of any thing by outward force,” 
only by “light and evidence” (Ibid.). Presumably, the state could compel someone by the 
threat of force, or by the promise of reward, to outwardly profess and practice a religion 
they do not inwardly believe; but Locke assures us that this would hinder rather than 
advance their chances for salvation. So the state should commit its resources to 
improving men’s temporal lives, leaving to each man the care of his eternal soul. 
   Locke’s argument is vulnerable in a number of respects. He does not explain how he 
knows that God requires sincerity and “inward persuasion” for salvation. In addition, the 
psychological premise about the invulnerability of belief to coercion is doubtful, 
especially if “outward force” is construed broadly enough to include mandatory religious 
education and the banning of heterodox religious publications and preaching. As Locke 
himself notes in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, what we know is at least 
partly subject to the will insofar as it is up to us to “with-hold or employ” our faculties 
“from this or that sort of objects.”7 Parents are partly responsible through coercive 
practices for the sincere religious beliefs of their adult children. Similarly, through the 
regulation of religious information, the state could effectively direct our faculties to a 
preferred faith and stimulate inward persuasion without directly manipulating belief.8 
   Furthermore, Locke’s argument assumes that successful conversion to the true religion 
is the only plausible motive for religious intolerance. Yet in Locke’s own day, 
imprisonment, expulsion, and genocide were commonly employed to enforce religious 
uniformity, not so much by enlarging the flock as by culling it. And although Locke 
himself is generally opposed to religious persecution—better to risk apostasy and schism 
than insist on doctrinal conformity to no religious end—he does acknowledge valid limits 
to toleration. Thus, no religion can be tolerated “which is constituted upon such a bottom, 
that all those who enter into it, do thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the 
protection and service of another prince” (Letter 31). With this limitation, Locke may 
have Catholics in mind, but he singles out Turkish Muslims for special mention: “it is 
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ridiculous for any one to profess himself to be a Mahometan only in religion, but in every 
thing else a faithful subject to a Christian magistrate, whilst at the same time he 
acknowledges himself bound to yield blind obedience to the mufti of Constantinople; 
who himself is entirely obedient to the Ottoman emperor” (Ibid.). The same principle 
might be employed today against Zionist Jews who maintain allegiance to the state of 
Israel while residing in another country. 
   He also exempts from the protection of toleration those religions which arrogate to their 
own members “any peculiar privilege or power above other mortals, in civil 
concernments,” e.g., contract only among its own (“faith is not kept with heretics”) or 
denial of genuine authority of magistrates outside its faith (“dominion is founded in 
grace”) (Letter 30-31). The social contract depends on equal treatment in social dealings 
and universal acknowledgement of the rule of law. Finally, whereas Catholics and 
Muslims are suspect for subordinating the authority of the sovereign to a pope or mufti, 
atheists, in Locke’s view, are not to be trusted because they cannot be subjected to any 
law at all: “promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can 
have no hold upon an atheist” (Letter 31).9 Since such groups cannot be compelled to 
believe, then by Locke’s own psychological principles one presumes their dangerous 
“inward persuasion” must be suppressed as much as possible by “outward force.” 
   These three exceptions to the Lockean principle of toleration all undermine social 
stability by straightforwardly encouraging or permitting usurpation, derogation, or, in the 
case of atheism, simple disregard, of the legitimate civic authority. I will return shortly to 
question whether such exemptions are consistent and legitimate. But it is first worth 
considering one other ground for state censure and intolerance, which Locke mentions 
almost in passing but which raises particularly interesting and difficult issues. Along with 
those religions that flagrantly undermine or threaten sovereign authority, Locke adds to 
the list “those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of 
mere religion” (Letter 31). It should be clear that this requirement to “own and teach” 
toleration, although it is rarely discussed independently, goes beyond the other three 
conditions.10 For it seems possible that a religion should espouse articles of faith, 
ostensibly grounded on divine command, which impinge in no way on civic authority but 
which also make no provision for toleration in Locke’s sense. The question of toleration 
simply does not arise, for example, for a sect that advocates complete and mutual 
isolation of civic and religious affairs (any more than night and day should need to 
“tolerate” one another). Quakers, Congregationalists, and Anabaptists (such as the 
Mennonites) approached this model in Locke’s own context. Also, churches with a 
strongly prophetic orientation may provide no role for toleration, even though they pose 
no immediate threat to civic authority, because they await the establishment (or return) of 
God’s kingdom on earth. Various strains of Millenarianism represented such an attitude 
in Locke’s day.11 All of these churches are potentially subject to intolerance from the 
Lockean state merely for failing to “own and teach” tolerance. 
   It is possible that this requirement was merely an ad hoc device of Locke to constrain 
the more radical, separationist strains of English religious dissent. But I am mainly 
concerned with the theoretical justification of the “own and teach” requirement. Since 
Locke offers none, we will need to speculate. One might hold, on contractarian grounds, 
that enjoying the benefits of toleration obligates one to promulgate toleration of other’s 
beliefs, just as enjoying security from foreign or domestic invasion obliges one to support 
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the military or police through taxes or service. Such a rationale is suggested by Locke’s 
observation that we should tolerate religious minorities because we would want to be 
tolerated if we were in their place: “what if in another country, to a Mahometan or a 
Pagan prince, the Christian religion seemed false and offensive to God; may not the 
Christians for the same reason, and after the same manner, be extirpated there?” (Letter 
24). Yet this ignores a crucial asymmetry in the religious case. We all have an equal 
interest in peace and security; but with respect to religion our interest is above all 
salvation for our eternal souls rather than merely our peculiar form of worship. And so, 
“there being but one truth, one way to heaven” (Letter 7), charity requires us to share this 
truth with those who have tolerated us, rather than merely to acquiesce in their error by 
tolerating them in turn. The point is not, of course, that among the great variety of 
religions and sects, one is likely to stand out as more certain than all the others,12 nor that 
intolerance of the churches we regard as errant is likely to bring about their conversion. 
The point is rather that, from the perspective of the faithful of a given sect, the benefit 
they receive from a tolerant state is not simply freedom of conscience but a chance for 
eternal life.13 
   So it is not clear that religions acquire from being tolerated an obligation to express and 
teach toleration that overrides the saving of souls. There is, I think, a stronger 
philosophical basis for Locke’s requirement that tolerated religions themselves “own and 
teach” toleration. Since the state is unable to direct citizens to the truth by coercive 
means—“nor are fire and sword any proper instruments wherewith to convince men’s 
minds of error” (Letter 12)—inward religious errancy must be tolerated so long as it does 
not undermine civic authority. But since there is no question that for Locke religious 
errancy jeopardizes souls, one might have expected him to impose limitations on 
heretical religious speech and display, which would certainly fall within the state’s power 
and purview. In fact, Locke believes that toleration of “inward persuasion” entails quite 
liberal toleration of “outward worship”: “the magistrate has no power to enforce by law 
either in his own church, or much less in another, the use of any rites or ceremonies 
whatsoever in the worship of God” (Letter 19). For Locke, free worship is not merely an 
incidental component of religious practice but essential to religion itself. Because the aim 
of religious belief is salvation, therefore a church is by definition “a voluntary society of 
men, joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshipping 
of God, in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation 
of their souls” (Letter 7). And, as mentioned above, Locke takes it as obvious that such 
worship will be “effectual” only if it is sincere: “whatsoever is practised in the worship of 
God, is only so far justifiable as it is believed by those that practise it to be acceptable 
unto him” (Letter 19). Since religious belief is the sincere hope that I will be saved by 
worship and doctrine “acceptable” to God, my faith cannot be severed from a set of 
practices. 
   This explains, I believe, why Locke thinks that among the practices of tolerable 
religions must be to “own and teach” toleration. For it will not be possible to isolate 
intolerant religious doctrines from open espousal and implementation, such doctrines 
necessarily seeming to their faithful as acceptable to God and required for salvation. But 
in many cases, this implementation will be inconsistent with strict toleration. For 
example, if a Millenarian church believes the “end is nigh,” and that only those firmly 
convinced of this will be saved, these beliefs will inevitably be expressed in practices that 
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are contrary to social stability. Provisions will be hoarded within the religious 
community, education and labor will be abandoned, and since time is short, allegiance 
will be transferred from the civil authorities, who are concerned with trivial, mundane 
affairs, to the ecclesiastical authorities, who are focused on the world about to arrive. 
Moreover, with the clock ticking and so many souls at stake, forced conversion could 
seem a quite reasonable last resort. But if this same church requires toleration itself as a 
condition of salvation, Locke may suppose, their Millenarian prophecies will not gain a 
foothold in anti-social practice. 
   Indeed, Locke makes it plain that the primary source of social strife is intolerance by 
and among Christian churches (that most “modest and peaceable religion”): 
 
It is not the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided), but the 
refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions (which might 
have been granted), that has produced all the bustles and wars that have 
been in the Christian world, upon account of religion. The heads and 
leaders of the church, moved by avarice and insatiable desire of dominion, 
making use of the immoderate ambition of magistrates, and the credulous 
superstition of the giddy multitude, have incensed and animated them 
against those that dissent from themselves (Letter 36). 
 
   Unchecked by civil authority, power-hungry church leaders are able to enflame their 
congregations and enlist corrupt government officials and princes in support of their 
religious persecution, which triggers an understandable backlash on the part of the 
unfavored sects, and eventually all-out civil war. This historical pattern will continue, 
Locke predicts, just so long as “magistrates should thus suffer these incendiaries, and 
disturbers of the public peace” (Ibid.). So a policy of “enforced toleration” is for Locke 
not a moral ideal but a practical necessity for the short- and long-term stability of the 
commonwealth. 
   That Locke conceives doctrinal toleration primarily as a practical safeguard against the 
outbreak of enthusiastic intolerance harmful to civil peace explains, I think, his treatment 
of the biblical Mosaic law requiring the faithful to “root out” idolatry. He does not 
condemn the injunction as intolerant, which it certainly is, nor excuse it as ineffectual or 
extraneous. Moses is not admonished for failing to “own and teach” toleration since in 
his special context, intolerance, even to the point of expulsion and forced conversion, is 
not a threat to civil authority. The reason is that in the “commonwealth of the Jews,” 
there can be no conflict between civil and religious authority because “God himself was 
the legislator” (Letter 24). The persecution of idolatry was therefore justified, and 
imperative, since idolatry was tantamount to treason. But Locke insists that there are no 
longer any such commonwealths, certainly not Christian ones. There is now a gap 
between the aims of the sovereign (securing peace) and the aims of the various religious 
sects (saving souls) and so idolatry cannot be prohibited by civil law. On the contrary, in 
order to ensure that the aims of religion and state do not come into conflict, religious 
pluralism must be tolerated by the state and embraced by even the most evangelical of 
churches. To this end, “one may employ as many exhortations and arguments as he 
pleases, towards the promoting of another man’s salvation. But all force and compulsion 
are to be forborn” (Letter 27). 
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   Conceived in this way, Locke’s “own and teach” condition imposes rather strict limits 
on religious toleration by the state, i.e., a rather low bar for religious persecution. To 
qualify as a legitimate target of persecution, a church need not pose any immediate threat 
to social peace and stability. It is enough that it does not explicitly condemn intolerance 
as a greater sin than heresy, infidelity, and idolatry. Applied today, this would exclude 
nearly all theistic religious orientations outside of liberal Protestantism (Locke’s own 
orientation), including Christian, Jewish, and Muslim fundamentalism. And of course, all 
forms of atheism and non-theistic religions are exempted from toleration, regardless of 
their explicit moral codes, since no one who denies God can be trusted. Consequently, it 
is worth considering the slightly earlier defense of toleration presented by Spinoza, since 
it seems to offer a more expansive case for religious freedom. 
 
III.  Spinoza on Toleration 
 
Spinoza’s major political treatise, the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP),14 was 
published anonymously in 1670, fifteen years before Locke wrote his Letter on toleration. 
Like the Letter, the TTP is concerned above all with the relation, and potential conflict, 
between civil and religious authority. Although their personal religious convictions were 
very different—Locke a devout theist and Spinoza a naturalistic pantheist (i.e., atheist)—
they shared considerable ground on the question of religious toleration. They agreed, 
following Hobbes, that the state originates with an exchange of absolute individual 
liberty or “natural rights” for peace and security. Since “everyone wishes to live as far as 
possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and this would be quite impossible so long as 
everyone did everything he liked” (TTP 16, p. 202), we voluntarily transfer our rights to a 
sovereign who “will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and whom everyone will be 
bound to obey, under pain of the severest punishment” (TTP 16, p. 205). This authority 
extends to all important aspects of social life, including the practice of religion: “the 
sovereign power, which alone is bound both by Divine and natural right to preserve and 
guard the laws of the state, should have supreme authority for making any laws about 
religion which it thinks fit” (TTP 16, p. 212). 
   And yet Spinoza insists that, “the best government will allow freedom of philosophical 
speculation no less than of religious belief” (TTP 20, p. 261). As with Locke, toleration 
of religious belief, even when it is grossly erroneous, is warranted on practical rather than 
moral grounds: “He who seeks to regulate everything by law, is more likely to arouse 
vices than to reform them. It is best to grant what cannot be abolished, even though it be 
in itself harmful” (TTP 20, p. 261). Like Locke, he maintains that genuine religious 
belief, and indeed genuine conviction of any sort, cannot be imposed by external fiat or 
coercion: “However unlimited, therefore, the power of a sovereign may be, however 
implicitly it is trusted as the exponent of law and religion, it can never prevent men from 
forming judgments according to their intellect” (TTP 20, p. 258).15 For this reason, as he 
puts it in his later, unpublished Tractatus Politicus (TP), “the mind, so far as it makes use 
of reason, is dependent, not on the supreme authorities, but on itself. And so the true 
knowledge and the love of God cannot be subject to the dominion of any” (TP III, 10, p. 
305). Thus, it is an “abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights of subjects, to 
seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true, or rejected as false, or what opinions 
should actuate men in their worship of God” (TTP 20, p. 257). 
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   For Spinoza, once again as for Locke, toleration is justifiably limited if it threatens the 
core function of the state: “to free every man from fear, that he may live in all possible 
security” (TTP 20, p. 259). Acts are intolerable simply insofar as they contravene the 
laws that are established to this end. Moreover, certain mere opinions are “seditious” and 
intolerable in themselves. For example, there can be no toleration of men who, like 
Locke’s atheists, “hold that promises ought not to be kept or that everyone should live as 
he pleases” since such opinions “abrogate the contract which tacitly or openly he made 
with his rulers” (TTP 20, p. 260).16 But in general, in ceding his right of free action, the 
citizen nevertheless retains the right of “free reason and judgment” (TTP 20, p. 257), 
even when this judgment is directly contrary to particular laws. Consequently, a citizen 
may be justly compelled “to act in contradiction to what he believes, and openly feels, to 
be the best” and to obey the sovereign commands “though he believes them to be most 
absurd” (TP VI, 39, p. 326). We may be compelled, for example, to participate in state-
sponsored religious observances and ceremonies; but we cannot be compelled to believe 
the creeds we recite there. 
   Evidently, Spinoza draws a more radical distinction even than Locke between a 
citizen’s “inward” judgment and his “outward” actions. I argued that Locke must require 
religions to “own and teach” tolerance because inward opinions to the contrary will 
inevitably gain purchase in outward practice and thereby undermine civic authority. And 
(although Locke does not appreciate this point sufficiently) outward practice, especially 
religious education and ritual, cannot fail to influence inward belief. But Spinoza sees no 
theoretical problem, and only minor practical difficulties, in a state wherein “everybody 
submits to the control of authority over his actions but not over his judgment and reason” 
(TTP 20, p. 263). It is true that the heterodox may need to submit to “external rites” at 
odds with their internal convictions—as Spinoza’s ancestors were forced to convert to 
Christianity—but such rites “ought not to be held of such importance that they should be 
thought worthwhile on their account to disturb public peace and quiet” (TP III, 10, p. 
305). Although he is no less concerned than Locke to safeguard civic authority, this 
radical divorce between reason and practice is precisely what enables Spinoza to grant 
near universal latitude in matters of individual opinion, religious and otherwise, while 
insisting on absolute obedience and conformity in religious practice: “a man’s loyalty to 
the state should be judged, like his loyalty to God, from his actions only” (TTP 20, p. 
261).17 
   That Spinoza conceives the gap between individual judgment and social practice as 
absolutely unbridgeable is shown in his analysis of the biblical rule of Moses. Like 
Locke, he perceives in this rule a historically unique convergence of state and church: “in 
the Hebrew state the civil and religious authority, each consisting solely of obedience to 
God, were one and the same.” Locke emphasized that in such special circumstances the 
question of tolerating private religious heterodoxy (e.g., idolatry) simply does not arise: 
“the subjects of that government both may, and ought to be kept in strict conformity with 
that church, by the civil power” (Letter 25). But Spinoza maintains that even in such a 
pure theocracy, the adage “every man’s understanding is his own” will be confirmed: 
“Moses, not by fraud, but by Divine virtue, gained such a hold over the popular judgment 
that he was accounted superhuman, and believed to speak and act through the inspiration 
of the Deity; nevertheless, even he could not escape murmurs and evil interpretations” 
(TTP 20, p. 257). 
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   Since “divine law does not demand the performance of ceremonies” (TTP 4, p. 61), it 
follows that rites and rituals in themselves “have nothing to do with a state of 
blessedness” (TTP 5, p. 76). As evidence of the latter, Spinoza cites the Dutch in Japan, 
who remain faithful Christians even though they “are enjoined by their East India 
Company not to practise any outward rites of religion” (TTP 5, p. 76). Outward religious 
worship in Spinoza’s ideal state will be simple and unadorned. Apart from inward love 
and obedience of God, the “worship of God consists only in justice and charity, or love 
towards one’s neighbor” (TTP 14, p. 187). This enjoinment, along with a few other 
minimal tenets of this “universal religion” (such as that God exists and is one), constitute 
the doctrinal foundation of the state church. In the Tractatus Politicus he stipulates that 
this church will be large, publicly funded, and governed by the patricians of the city. 
Smaller, private religion will be tolerated but kept within strict limits: “those that are 
attached to another religion are, indeed, to be allowed to build as many temples as they 
please; yet these are to be small, and limited to a certain standard of size, and on sites at 
some little distance one from another” (TP VIII, 46, p. 368). 
   Because outward religious practice breeds superstition and schism, which threaten 
social peace, and because it has no particular connection to inward religious judgment or 
blessedness, Spinoza’s toleration is very circumspect. However, there is one sort of 
action that he thinks must be granted considerable latitude, namely speech.18 Human 
beings, he finds, are simply incapable of keeping their opinions to themselves: “men’s 
common failing is to confide their plans to others” (TTP 20, p. 258). Far from promoting 
civil peace, if “men be so bound down, that they do not dare to utter a whisper, save at 
the bidding of their rulers,” the social consequences would be disastrous. For men, at 
least virtuous ones, “resent the branding as criminal of opinions which they believe to be 
true” to such an extent that they would perpetuate rebellion and risk exile or death in 
defense of free expression (TTP 20, p. 262). Furthermore, even among ordinary citizens, 
if oppressive laws were enacted to the point that “men would be daily thinking one thing 
and doing another,” we would become in effect habitual liars. The social upshot of this 
would be “the corruption of good faith, that mainstay of government” (TTP 20, p. 261). 
For these reasons, Spinoza therefore grants considerable freedom of speech, even if 
“propounded and published with unworthy motives” (Ibid.).19 Still, restrictions on certain 
kinds of speech, such as openly seditious pamphlets and “conventicles,” will not be 
tolerated: “authority may be as much injured by words as by actions” (TTP 20, p. 258). 
 
IV.  Locke and Spinoza: Moderate vs. Radical? 
 
The eminent historian of the Dutch Golden Age and Enlightenment, Jonathan Israel, has 
emphasized the deep differences between the Lockean and Spinozist theories of 
toleration. Locke’s conception, he maintains, is at bottom “theological” since it is rooted 
in the assumption that each person is responsible for securing his or her own salvation by 
the means of worship acceptable to God. Spinoza’s notion is in essence “republican” 
since it is concerned primarily with securing freedom of thought and speech, rather than 
belief or worship, and with minimizing the divisive authority of ecclesiastical offices and 
teaching. This explains why Locke exempts atheists from toleration, while Spinoza 
considers it irrelevant, in religious matters, whose beliefs are true or false: “faith does not 
demand that dogmas should be true as that they should be pious” (TTP 14, p. 185). In 
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Israel’s terms, Spinoza’s brand of toleration represents the “radical” Enlightenment, 
Locke’s the “moderate.”20 
   Although there is much to be said for Israel’s concept of the Radical Enlightenment, it 
seems to me that he underestimates the radical import of Lockean toleration and 
exaggerates the breadth and depth of Spinozistic toleration. It is true that for Locke the 
magistrate must tolerate religious self-determination among his subjects because he is 
powerless to secure salvation on their behalf. This does not mean the social structure of 
religion would be left unaffected by the implementation of Lockean toleration. As we 
have seen, Locke agrees with Spinoza that intolerant doctrines and preaching from within 
churches, aided by superstitious congregations and corrupt politicians, constitutes the 
major threat to civil peace. Consequently, the Lockean state is empowered not only to 
ban religions that explicitly usurp or derogate civic authority, but also to require any 
religion to “internalize” (own and teach) toleration with respect to any other religion. For 
Locke, this means any church would be required to preach, as a matter of dogma, that the 
members of all other churches must be given equal, unprejudiced treatment in all 
“temporal” affairs, presumably including education, business, and politics. In addition, 
other church doctrines may need to be conceived in light of the toleration imperative, 
most obviously, those relating to idolatry, heresy, and infidelity, but also concepts of the 
Sabbath, diet, oaths, inter-marriage, usury, etc. Certain historical and eschatological 
doctrines might also require modification to be made consistent with toleration, insofar as 
these record or anticipate differential treatment of the unfaithful. Even if rigorously 
applied, Locke’s tolerationist policy would not reduce all sects to Spinoza’s “universal 
religion”; but over time it would drastically reduce the sectarian and segregationist 
tendencies of most intolerant factions. 
   As for Spinoza’s more “radical” conception of the tolerant state, we should keep well in 
mind that the sovereign retains “the right to treat as enemies all men whose opinions do 
not, on all subjects, entirely coincide with its own” (TTP 20, p. 258), even though it 
would be unwise and in fact impossible for it to compel the judgment of its subjects. 
Nevertheless, in order to prevent the usurpation of civil authority, “the right of control 
over spiritual matters depends absolutely on the decree of the sovereign” (TTP 19, p. 
254). All rites of outward worship, in both the large state religion and the smaller 
permitted churches, are determined by the sovereign alone in accordance with public 
peace and well-being. As for the toleration of atheism, although Spinoza states clearly 
that “the supreme right of free thinking, even on religion, is in every man’s power” (TTP 
7, pp. 118–19), he also argues at great length that the knowledge and belief in the 
Scriptures (as moral narratives rather than doctrine) are necessary to the masses and 
someone who denies them owing to disbelief in God is rightly judged impious (TTP 5, p. 
78). And the first dogma of the “universal religion” that is promulgated as the state 
church is that “God or a Supreme Being exists.” Under these conditions, actual disbelief 
will seem to be a rare privilege of the intellectual elite (like Spinoza himself), divorced 
from lifestyle and typically unspoken. But it is for the best of all that the multitudes 
receive their religion from the sovereign rather than from free and independent thought: 
 
Men are very prone to error on religious subjects, and, according to the 
diversity of their dispositions, are wont with considerable stir to put 
forward their own inventions, as experience more than sufficiently attests, 
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so that if no one were bound to obey the state in matters which, in his own 
opinion concern religion, the rights of the state would be dependent on 
every man’s judgment and passions. No one would consider himself 
bound to obey laws framed against his faith or superstition; and on this 
pretext he might assume unbounded license (TTP 16, pp.  211–12). 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
In the Netherlands, toleration is celebrated as a national virtue in much the way liberty is 
celebrated in the United States. During our meetings in The Hague (only a few blocks 
from Spinoza’s grave and across the street from the Dutch Parliament), we heard 
endorsements of Dutch toleration (sometimes tinged with academic cynicism) from 
remarkably different perspectives: Somali immigrants, gay activists, Calvinist Christians, 
and conservative politicians. At the conclusion of the TTP, Spinoza himself exploits, or 
simply displays, this aspect of the Dutch self-image: 
 
The city of Amsterdam reaps the fruit of this freedom in its own great 
prosperity and in the admiration of all other people. For in this most 
flourishing state, and most splendid city, men of every nation and religion 
live together in the greatest harmony, and ask no questions before trusting 
their goods to a fellow-citizen, save whether he be rich or poor, and 
whether he generally acts honestly, or the reverse. His religion and sect is 
considered of no importance: for it has no effect before the judges in 
gaining or losing a cause, and there is no sect so despised that its 
followers, provided that they harm no one, pay every man his due, and live 
uprightly, are deprived of the protection of the magisterial authority (TTP 
20, p. 264). 
 
   It is difficult to know how sincerely this is intended, appearing as it does in a book 
published anonymously, by an author who was unable to publish his magnum opus in 
Holland during his lifetime. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Spinoza’s homage to the 
city of his birth would still ring true, at least as an ideal, to a broad spectrum of Dutch 
residents.21 It is less clear whether his actual theory of toleration, however far-thinking 
and “modern” it is esteemed by liberal scholars, provides a useful model for 
contemporary Dutch society. His “freedom to philosophize” favors a highly rationalistic 
“inward” conception of “blessedness” that radically detaches religious expression from 
its cultural context. As the child of religious refugees as well as someone expelled from 
his own religious community, Spinoza naturally derived immense value from such inner 
devotion (which in the Ethics he terms the “Intellectual Love of God”). Outward religious 
conformity (or at least invisibility) on the part of the diverse immigrant communities, in 
terms of dress, prayer and worship, would amount to a partial surrender of cultural 
identity. Diversity, which is also celebrated by most Dutch, would be sacrificed for an 
officious and begrudging tolerance. But is it really necessary to trade cultural pluralism 
for the freedom to philosophize? Spinoza’s fear that “no one would consider himself 
bound to obey laws framed against his faith” (TTP 16, p. 212) if the state did not regulate 
religion perhaps finds some recent, if isolated, support from incidents of religiously 
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motivated violence in Europe, including the murder of Theo Van Gogh. Yet given the 
long history of relatively peaceable settlement of religious minorities in Holland and 
other EU countries, not to mention the evident power and stability of the Dutch state 
itself, it is hard to perceive a risk of religious wars or theocratic sedition anywhere near 
seventeenth-century levels. 
   What of the compelling idea that intolerance must not be tolerated? As mentioned in 
the introduction this notion has played a central role in the rhetoric of recent Dutch anti-
immigrant movements. Thus, Pim Fortuyn, who was assassinated in 2002, frequently 
asserted that Muslim culture was inconsistent with the tolerant Dutch values that enabled 
an openly homosexual man (such as he was) to become leader of a major political party.22 
We have seen that John Locke, while living in Amsterdam, came to the same conclusion 
that churches must “own and teach” toleration in order warrant toleration. Although 
Locke did not fully articulate the motivations for this view, and for this reason he has 
earned the reputation of a “moderate,” I think they are clear enough. Like Spinoza, Locke 
feared that heterodox religious movements, unless they were kept in check, would co-opt 
and usurp the authority of the state at the cost of peace. Despite his own, Spinozistic 
distinction between inward belief and outward practice, Locke understood much better 
than Spinoza that intolerant doctrines cannot be absolutely divorced from intolerant 
actions. Requiring doctrinal toleration in exchange for the privilege of being tolerated 
(i.e., of existing) would help to remove the threat of insurrection. 
   However reasonable Locke’s own fears, it is difficult to extend them to the Holland of 
today. Whatever can be said for or against their moral value, the allegedly intolerant 
doctrines of immigrant religions seem not to have reduced the celebrated social freedoms 
of Dutch society nor posed any serious threat to the Dutch state.23 On the contrary, 
religious orthodoxy seems as reserved in Holland under immigrant guise as it was for 
hundreds of years under Calvinist guise. (I am reminded of the various religious 
missions, including the Oude Kerk, interspersed among the prostitution windows, coffee 
shops, and sex shops of the red-light district.) At least for the time being, those looking 
for philosophical arguments to limit religious toleration in the Netherlands will need to 
look beyond the patron saints Spinoza and Locke.  
 
Notes 
 
1.  See Buruma 2006 for an accessible account of recent anti-immigrant movements in 
the Netherlands. See also Peninx 2006 and Buijs 2009.   
2.  See Nobbs 1938; Israel 1995; Berkvens-Stevelinck et al. 1997; Grell and Porter 2000; 
Po-Chia Hsia and Van Nierop 2002; Zagorin 2003; and the contribution of Joop de Jong 
in this volume. 
3.  See Nadler 2001.  
4.  See Ashcraft 1986, chap. 9; and Woolhouse 2007, chap. 6.   
5.  See Marshall 2006 and Woolhouse 2007.  
6.  See Israel 1995, p. 658; Marshall 2006, chap. 12; and Van Rooden 2002. 
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7.  Essay 4, 13, p. 2. 
8.  See Waldron 1988.  
9.  For detailed discussion of Locke on the toleration of atheists, see Waldron 2002, chap. 
8. Another important philosopher of toleration, also a Dutch resident, Pierre Bayle, took 
the opposite stance on atheism and morality: “atheism does not necessarily lead to the 
corruption of morals” (2000, p. 133). For more on Bayle and toleration, see Israel 2006, 
chap. 6; Marshall 2006; and Zagorin 2003, chap. 7.  
10. In his recent, 750+ page book on toleration in the seventeenth century, John Marshall 
devotes only one page to toleration of the intolerant (2006, pp. 681–712).  
11. On Early Modern millenarianism, see Force and Popkin 2001.    
12. This is why, for Locke, we cannot justify intolerance on the grounds that the 
magistrate has special access to the truth in religious matters: “neither the right, nor the 
art of ruling, does necessarily carry along with it the certain knowledge of other things; 
and least of all of the true religion” (Letter 16). For discussion, see Harris 1994, chap. 6.  
 
13. Nor is this not to deny that the untenability of universalized intolerance constitutes a 
powerful argument for tolerance, although contrary to Tuckness 2008, I do not think this 
is Locke’s main argument for toleration. For criticism of Tuckness’ approach, see De 
Roover and Balagangadhara 2008. The question that concerns me here is specifically the 
philosophical basis for Locke’s “own and teach” condition.  
14. Essentially the same doctrine is asserted by Hobbes, who may have exerted an 
influence on both Spinoza and Locke on this point. See, for example, Leviathan, chap. 
45, sec. 37 (Hobbes 1994, p. 266). How our inalienable power of forming religious 
judgments relates to Spinoza’s metaphysical conceptions of freedom and “conatus” in his 
Ethics is not altogether clear. For a good recent discussion, see Rosenthal 2003.  
15. See further, Laursen 1996, pp. 189–90.  
16. For critical discussion, see Balibar 1998, chap. 2. 
17. See Smith 1998, pp. 156–158.  
18. On Spinoza’s difficulties securing publication, see Israel 2001, chap. 16.  
19. Israel 2000, p. 103. See also, Israel 1999 and 2006, chap. 6. Laursen 1996 provides a 
similar comparison between Locke and Spinoza on toleration.  
20. As might another reference by Spinoza to Dutch culture: “What nation ever had to 
pay so many and so heavy taxes as the Dutch? Yet it not only has not been exhausted, 
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but, on the contrary, has been so mighty by its wealth, that all envied its good fortune” 
(TP VIII, 31; 360). 
 
21. Fortuyn compared the strict moral principles of Islam to those of the Calvinist 
Reform Church: “You see the same thing in Muslim culture. Now look at the 
Netherlands. Where could a candidate for a huge political movement such as my own be 
openly gay? I take huge pride in that. And I’d like to keep it that way” quoted in Buruma 
2006, p. 57. See also Spruyt 2009. For further discussion, see Eisenberg 2009.  
22. John Rawls summarizes a more pluralistic and moderate attitude to an “intolerant 
sect” within a tolerant society: “its freedom should be restricted only when the tolerant 
sincerely and with reason believe that their security and the institutions of liberty are in 
danger” (1971, p. 220).  
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